IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00163731.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Social structure and reputation: the NASDAQ case study

Author

Listed:
  • Valérie Revest

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (ancienne affiliation) - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Samira Guennif

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (ancienne affiliation) - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In 1996, two investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the American Department of Justice reported non-competitive practices among market makers on the NASDAQ. These reports also mentioned the influence of the NASDAQ social structure on market makers' behaviours. Most market makers adopted social norms in order to increase significantly their income at the expense of the customers. This paper aims to explain the rise and long-term effects of non-competitive practices, through the integration of a concrete view of "embeddedness" (Granovetter, 1985). We propose the use of game theory tools to achieve this goal. A rereading of Kreps' model of reputation sheds light on its structural dimension and illustrates the way social structure governs individual behaviours.

Suggested Citation

  • Valérie Revest & Samira Guennif, 2005. "Social structure and reputation: the NASDAQ case study," Post-Print halshs-00163731, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00163731
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00163731
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00163731/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Miller, Merton H & Cone, Kenneth R & Fischel, Daniel R & Ross, David J, 1997. "Clustering and Competition in Asset Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 23-60, April.
    2. Dutta, Prajit K & Madhavan, Ananth, 1997. "Competition and Collusion in Dealer Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 245-276, March.
    3. Simon, Herbert A, 1978. "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 1-16, May.
    4. Kandel, Eugene & Marx, Leslie M., 1997. "Nasdaq market structure and spread patterns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 61-89, July.
    5. Christie, William G & Harris, Jeffrey H & Schultz, Paul H, 1994. "Why Did NASDAQ Market Makers Stop Avoiding Odd-Eighth Quotes?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(5), pages 1841-1860, December.
    6. Edward H. Lorenz, 1993. "Flexible Production Systems and the Social Construction of Trust," Politics & Society, , vol. 21(3), pages 307-324, September.
    7. Demsetz, Harold, 1997. "Limit orders and the alleged Nasdaq collusion," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 91-95, July.
    8. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    9. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
    10. Edward Lorenz, 1988. "Neither Friends nor Strangers," Post-Print halshs-00483728, HAL.
    11. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2002. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 419-436, November.
    12. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-157, January.
    13. Christie, William G & Schultz, Paul H, 1994. "Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(5), pages 1813-1840, December.
    14. Hirschman, Albert O., 1985. "Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating some Categories of Economic Discourse," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 7-21, April.
    15. Klein, Benjamin, 1980. "Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(2), pages 356-362, May.
    16. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    17. Edward Lorenz, 1993. "Flexible Production Systems and the Social Construction of Trust," Post-Print halshs-00483723, HAL.
    18. Barclay, Michael J., 1997. "Bid-ask spreads and the avoidance of odd-eighth quotes on Nasdaq: An examination of exchange listings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 35-60, July.
    19. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Riccardo Boero & Giangiacomo Bravo & Marco Castellani & Francesco Laganà & Flaminio Squazzoni, 2009. "Pillars of Trust: An Experimental Study on Reputation and Its Effects," Sociological Research Online, , vol. 14(5), pages 49-67, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joe Chen, 2005. "The Market Structure of Nasdaq Dealer Markets and Quoting Conventions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-040, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    2. Joe Chen, 2005. "The Market Structure of Nasdaq Dealer Markets and Quoting Conventions," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-357, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    3. Schwert, G. William, 1997. "Symposium on market microstructure: Focus on Nasdaq," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 3-8, July.
    4. Lucy F. Ackert & Bryan K. Church, 1998. "Competitiveness and price setting in dealer markets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 83(Q 3), pages 4-11.
    5. John Board & Charles Sutcliffe & Anne Vila, 2000. "Market Maker Performance: The Search for Fair Weather Market Makers," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 17(3), pages 259-276, September.
    6. Tse, Yiuman & Devos, Erik, 2004. "Trading costs, investor recognition and market response: An analysis of firms that move from the Amex (Nasdaq) to Nasdaq (Amex)," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 63-83, January.
    7. Benston, George J. & Wood, Robert A., 2008. "Why effective spreads on NASDAQ were higher than on the New York stock exchange in the 1990s," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 17-40, January.
    8. Christie, William G. & Schultz, Paul H., 1999. "The initiation and withdrawal of odd-eighth quotes among Nasdaq stocks: an empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 409-442, June.
    9. John Board & Charles Sutcliffe & Stephen Wells, 2002. "Transparency and Fragmentation," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-4039-0707-3, September.
    10. Haucap, Justus, 2017. "The rule of law and the emergence of market exchange: A new institutional economic perspective," DICE Discussion Papers 276, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    11. Katrina Ellis & Roni Michaely & Maureen O'Hara, 2002. "The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the Trading of Nasdaq Stocks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 2289-2316, October.
    12. Jasiniak Magdalena, 2018. "Determinants of Investment Decisions on the Capital Market," Financial Internet Quarterly (formerly e-Finanse), Sciendo, vol. 14(2), pages 1-8, June.
    13. Salomonsson, Marcus, 2009. "Introducing a spread into the Kyle model," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 713, Stockholm School of Economics.
    14. Eric Benhamou & Thomas Serval, 2000. "On the Competition Between ECNs, Stock Markets and Market Makers," FMG Discussion Papers dp345, Financial Markets Group.
    15. Hasbrouck, Joel, 1999. "Security bid/ask dynamics with discreteness and clustering: Simple strategies for modeling and estimation1," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 1-28, February.
    16. Levin, Eric J. & Wright, Robert E., 2004. "Estimating the profit markup component of the bid-ask spread: evidence from the London Stock Exchange," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-19, February.
    17. Lamoureux, Christopher G. & Schnitzlein, Charles R., 2004. "Microstructure with multiple assets: an experimental investigation into direct and indirect dealer competition," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-143, February.
    18. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
    19. Blau, Benjamin M. & Griffith, Todd G., 2016. "Price clustering and the stability of stock prices," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(10), pages 3933-3942.
    20. Joel Hasbrouck, 1998. "Security Bid/Ask Dynamics with Discreteness and Clustering: Simple Strategies for Modeling and Estimation," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 98-042, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    NASDAQ; non-competitive behaviours; embeddedness; social structure; game theory; reputation; trust;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00163731. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.