Yardstick Competition for Transport Infrastructure Services
The hypothesis underlying this report is that yardstick competition might be an efficient way to regulate infrastructure provision, at least in its core activity: maintenance. But to support this hypothesis, we need to present yardstick competition quite extensively.Thus, this report is organised as follows:- The first chapter gives a brief overview of the regulation problem in order to present yardstick competition in the context of the various ways to regulate firms or utilities;- The second chapter presents yardstick competition more precisely with a theoretical approach;- The third chapter provides some examples of the use of yardstick competition in various industries;- The fourth chapter addresses the main point of the report: is yardstick competition possible and desirable for infrastructure provision?
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Publication status:||Published in ECMT (Ed.) = CEMT. Round Table 129 = Table ronde 129 - Transport services: Limits of (De-)Regulation = L'offre de transports : les limites de la (dé)réglementation, 2006, Paris, France. OECD = OCDE, pp. 63-108 (English language) - pp. 67-115 (version française), 2006|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00092671|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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