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Yardstick Competition for Transport Infrastructure Services

Author

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  • Dominique Bouf

    (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Julien Lévêque

    (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The hypothesis underlying this report is that yardstick competition might be an efficient way to regulate infrastructure provision, at least in its core activity: maintenance. But to support this hypothesis, we need to present yardstick competition quite extensively.Thus, this report is organised as follows:- The first chapter gives a brief overview of the regulation problem in order to present yardstick competition in the context of the various ways to regulate firms or utilities;- The second chapter presents yardstick competition more precisely with a theoretical approach;- The third chapter provides some examples of the use of yardstick competition in various industries;- The fourth chapter addresses the main point of the report: is yardstick competition possible and desirable for infrastructure provision?

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Bouf & Julien Lévêque, 2006. "Yardstick Competition for Transport Infrastructure Services," Post-Print halshs-00092671, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00092671
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00092671
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    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00092671/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Desmaris, Christian, 2014. "The reform of passenger rail in Switzerland: More performance without competition," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 290-297.
    2. Bouf, Dominique & Faivre d’Arcier, Bruno, 2015. "The looming crisis in French public transit," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 34-41.

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