Les infrastructures de transport et la logique financière du partenariat public-privé : quelques paradoxes
Transport Infrastructures and Public-Private Partnership Financing: Some Paradoxes. - The opportunity of private financing, building and operating of new infrastructure projects is more and more frequently explored by public authorities in the world. This trend is justified by various reasons. This paper concerns one of them which is a lower need of public financing and more specifically some questions: what is the consequence on public financing of a weak profitability rate of the project according to a public or private operator? is the “private going” only relevant with high profitability rates?One of the answer to these questions is what we call the paradox of profitability rate which can be formulated as following: the internal rate of return being supposed the same in the public and private case, the need of subsidies for a non self-financed project is higher with a private operator than with a public one, but the additional cost of the private issue is decreasing when the profitability rate of the project is itself decreasing.This article proposes a general demonstration of this paradox and its policy oriented implications, including in the case of a better efficiency of the private operator.
|Date of creation:||2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue Française d'Economie, Revue française d'économie, 2002, XVII (1), pp. 173-194|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00079845|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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