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Optimal Fiscal Policy with Heterogeneous Agents and Capital: Should We Increase or Decrease Public Debt and Capital Taxes?

Author

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  • François Le Grand

    (Rennes SB - Rennes School of Business, ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184) - ESSEC Business School - THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

  • Xavier Ragot

    (Sciences Po - Sciences Po, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

We analyze optimal fiscal policy in a heterogeneous-agent model with capital accumulation and aggregate shocks, where the government uses public debt, a capital tax, and a progressive labor tax to finance public spending. We first study a tractable model and show that the steady-state optimal capital tax can be positive if credit constraints are occasionally binding. However, the existence of such an equilibrium depends on the shape of the utility function. We also characterize the optimal dynamic of public debt after a public spending shock. We confirm these findings by solving for optimal policy in a general heterogeneous-agent model.

Suggested Citation

  • François Le Grand & Xavier Ragot, 2025. "Optimal Fiscal Policy with Heterogeneous Agents and Capital: Should We Increase or Decrease Public Debt and Capital Taxes?," Post-Print hal-05547657, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05547657
    DOI: 10.1086/734877
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05547657v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mendoza, Enrique G. & Razin, Assaf & Tesar, Linda L., 1994. "Effective tax rates in macroeconomics: Cross-country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 297-323, December.
    2. Grand, François Le & Ragot, Xavier, 2018. "A class of tractable incomplete-market models for studying asset returns and risk exposure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 39-59.
    3. King, Robert G. & Plosser, Charles I. & Rebelo, Sergio T., 1988. "Production, growth and business cycles : I. The basic neoclassical model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 195-232.
    4. Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-622, May.
    5. Marco Bassetto & Wei Cui, 2024. "A Ramsey Theory of Financial Distortions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(8), pages 2612-2654.
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    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

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