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Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum

Author

Listed:
  • Ingela Alger

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse)

  • Jörgen Weibull

    (SSE - Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2016, Games and Economic Behavior) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moralis with the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a stronger hypothesis that guarantees existence, and we also establish a new and closely related result. As a by-product, we also obtain an extension of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2013, Econometrica).

Suggested Citation

  • Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull, 2023. "Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum," Post-Print hal-04384501, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04384501
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.002
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04384501
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    2. Immanuel Bomze & Werner Schachinger & Jörgen Weibull, 2021. "Does moral play equilibrate?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 305-315, February.
    3. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2016. "Evolution and Kantian morality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 56-67.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ingela Alger & Laurent Lehmann, 2023. "Evolution of Semi-Kantian Preferences in Two-Player Assortative Interactions with Complete and Incomplete Information and Plasticity," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 1288-1319, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Preference evolution; evolutionary stability; morality; Homo moralis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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