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Regulating agriculture under asymmetric information : an empirical evaluation of the efficiency of subsidies to new farmers
[Modélisation des aides à l'installation en agriculture : une application de la théorie des contrats]

Author

Listed:
  • Catherine C. Benjamin

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Yves Le Roux
  • Euan Phimister

    (University of Aberdeen)

Abstract

Dans cette communication, les développements de la théorie des contrats sont utilisés pour effectuer une évaluation empirique de l'attribution de l'aide à l'installation en agriculture. On suppose que l'objectif du régulateur est de minimiser le coût du transfert (i.e. la subvention à l'installation), étant donné un objectif en termes d'installations. Le contrat optimal s'exprime en termes d'output réalisé par l'agriculteur installé et de transfert optimal qu'il est nécessaire de lui verser pour qu'il révèle ses vraies caractéristiques. L'application au cas français repose sur un panel de 853 exploitations, dont l'exploitant est âgé de plus de 55 ans : cette sélection permet de disposer d'observations sur des exploitations devant être ou non reprises par de jeunes agriculteurs dans les années suivantes. Les résultats obtenus permettent d'avoir une première appréciation de l'arbitrage que l'Etat doit effectuer entre un objectif de politique publique, le taux de reprise souhaité, et le coût de cette politique.

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine C. Benjamin & Yves Le Roux & Euan Phimister, 2000. "Regulating agriculture under asymmetric information : an empirical evaluation of the efficiency of subsidies to new farmers [Modélisation des aides à l'installation en agriculture : une application," Post-Print hal-02837723, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02837723
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02837723v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Environnement; espace et société;

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