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Qu'est-ce qu'une entreprise familiale?

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry Poulain-Rehm

    (CREFF - Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux 4)

Abstract

L'entreprise familiale est une forme d'organisation aux contours mal dessinés dans la littérature et parfois empreinte de confusion. Les auteurs développent tantôt une approche quantitative, en termes de contrôle par la famille du capital et des droits de vote, tantôt une approche qualitative, en termes d'influence sur le management et de culture d'entreprise. Alors que certains défendent une vision unidimensionnelle, d'autres, en revanche, combinent les deux ensembles de critères pour construire une vision polymorphe de l'entreprise familiale. Au regard de la pluralité des approches développées, la notion d'entreprise familiale apparaît éclatée. Il semble néanmoins possible de s'engager sur les voies d'une définition tout à la fois unifiée et plurielle en déployant une conception multicritères. Cette vision permet de donner naissance à une typologie classant et différenciant les entreprises selon l'intensité de leur nature familiale, qui est plus ou moins affirmée selon la place occupée par la famille dans le capital et le management. Dans cet article, l'opérationnalité de la typologie est mise à l'épreuve sur un échantillon de 26 firmes familiales figurant parmi les cent plus grandes entreprises françaises en termes de chiffre d'affaires.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Poulain-Rehm, 2006. "Qu'est-ce qu'une entreprise familiale?," Post-Print hal-01430990, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01430990
    DOI: 10.3917/rsg.219.0077
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01430990
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    References listed on IDEAS

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