Does Market Concentration Preclude Risk Taking in Baking?
We analyse risk-taking behaviour of banks in the context of a model based on spatial competition. Banks mobilise deposits by offering deposit rates. We show that when the market concentration is low, banks invest in the gambling asset. On the other hand, for sufficiently high levels of market concentration, all banks choose the prudent asset to invest in, and some depositors may even be left out of the market. Our results suggest a discontinuous relation between market concentration and social welfare.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2003|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2004|
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