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On the governance of start-ups

Author

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  • Ambec, S.

Abstract

This paper examines an entrepreneur-investor relationship in a stylized model where (i) investment needs are unknown ex ante and arise sequentially (ii) a major decision must be reached at a maturity strage, (iii) this decision depends on entrepreneur's private information, observable by the investor at some cost. The two partners agree on a corporate governance system which includes a split of futre cash-flows and an allocation of control on the above decision contingently on investment. It turns out that control is assigned to the entrepreneur for low investment levels and then switches to the investor when investment exceeds a threshold. Classification-JEL: G24; G32; L22

Suggested Citation

  • Ambec, S., 2004. "On the governance of start-ups," Working Papers 200406, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    • Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200406
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    File URL: https://gael.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/sites/gael/files/doc-recherche/WP/A2004/gael2004-06.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lacker, Jeffrey M & Weinberg, John A, 1989. "Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1345-1363, December.
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    3. Lerner, Josh & Merges, Robert P, 1998. "The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 125-156, June.
    4. Klaus M. Schmidt, 2003. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1139-1166, June.
    5. Gompers, Paul & Lerner, Josh, 1996. "The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 463-498, October.
    6. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Corporate Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
    8. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
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    12. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    13. Giacinta CESTONE, 2001. "Venture Capital Meets Contract Theory: Risky Claims or Formal Control?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 480.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    CONTINGENT CONTROL; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; VENTURE CAPITAL; BIOTECHNOLOGY;

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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