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Team production

Author

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  • Adhen Benlahlou

    () (Univ Lyon, UJM Saint-Etienne, GATE UMR 5824, F-42023 Saint-Etienne, France)

Abstract

This paper investigates games played on bipartite networks by introducing a team production function allowing for any pattern of cross effects between projects and cross effects between agents. By using a new representation of a bipartite network through a multilayers network, we are able to characterize the interior equilibrium efforts as a function of agents centralities in the multilayers network.

Suggested Citation

  • Adhen Benlahlou, 2018. "Team production," Working Papers 1822, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1822
    as

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    File URL: ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2018/1822.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chih-Sheng Hsieh & Michael D. König & Xiaodong Liu & Christian Zimmermann, 2018. "Superstar Economists: Coauthorship Networks and Research Output," CESifo Working Paper Series 7309, CESifo.
    2. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2006. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1403-1417, September.
    3. Chih-Sheng Hsieh & Michael D. König & Xiaodong Liu & Christian Zimmermann, 2018. "Superstar Economists: Coauthorship networks and research output," Working Papers 2018-28, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    4. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network games; centrality measures; spillovers; bipartite network;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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