Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Debt
We have argued that convertible debt can be better than a simple mixture of debt and equity in stage financing situations. When the venture capitalist retains the option to abandon the project if in the medium term he receives a negative signal, the entrepreneur has an incentive to engage in "window dressing" or short-termism , i.e. to bias the signal towards positive values, in order to reduce the probability that the project will be liquidated.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/foerder/about
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:23-97. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.