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Countertrade Transactions: Theory and Evidence

  • Caves, R.E.
  • Marin, D.

Countertrade consists of bilateral agreements (usually) between Western industrial enterprises and government agencies or state-owned enterprises in developing countries (LDCs) and centrally planned economies (CPEs), whereby sales of goods by the western exporter are linked contractually to the exporter’s purchases of other goods or services from the countertrade partner. This paper reports findings from a sample of 230 countertrade agreements. We develop an analytical framework that both explains the mutual attraction of countertrade deals to the parties and predicts the terms of trade in individual transactions. Various statistical tests serve to assess assumptions underlying the model, evaluate various predictions and corollaries, and distinguish between certain competing hypotheses about the motives or effects of countertrade transactions. -from Authors

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Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 1599.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1599
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  1. Caves, Richard E. & Marin, Dalia, 1992. "Countertrade Transactions: Theory and Evidence," Munich Reprints in Economics 3111, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  2. Amann, Erwin & Marin, Dalia, 1990. "Long Term Contracts in International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 413, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Marin, Dalia, 1990. "Tying in International Trade," Munich Reprints in Economics 3114, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Marin, Dalia, 1991. "Monopoly, Tying and Reciprocity: An Application to International Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 609, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Bruce Kogut, 1986. "On Designing Contracts to Guarantee Enforceability: Theory and Evidence from East-West Trade," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(1), pages 47-61, March.
  6. Marin,Dalia & Schnitzer,Monika, 1993. "Tying trade flows: A theory of countertrade," Discussion Paper Serie A 396, University of Bonn, Germany.
  7. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
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