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Barter for price discrimination

Author

Listed:
  • Sergei Guriev

  • Dmitriy Kvasov

    (University of Adelaide)

Abstract

We study barter as a discriminatory instrument in oligopoly with asymmetric information. Buyers (producers of final goods) differ in the quality of their products. Sellers (producers of inputs) use barter as a screening device: the higher quality buyers pay in cash while the lower quality ones pay in kind. Barter, identified with non-monetary contracts that give a seller control over a buyer's output, emerges in equilibrium even in the absence of financial constraints. There is a positive relationship between market concentration and the level of barter. Barter disappears as the market becomes more competitive. Barter and no-barter equilibria coexist for a range of market structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2004. "Barter for price discrimination," Post-Print hal-03416759, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03416759
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.09.003
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Minzyuk, Larysa, 2010. "The development of non-monetary means of payment," MPRA Paper 28167, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
    2. Guriev, Sergei & Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2009. "Imperfect competition in financial markets and capital structure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 131-146, October.
    3. Guriev, Sergei & Makarov, Igor & Maurel, Mathilde, 2002. "Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 635-656, December.
    4. Guriev, Sergei & Kvassov, Dmitri, 2004. "Barter for price discrimination," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 329-350, March.
    5. Murizah Osman Salleh & Aziz Jaafar & M. Shahid Ebrahim, 2011. "The Inhibition of Usury (Riba An-Nasi'ah) and the Economic Underdevelopment of the Muslim World," Working Papers 11002, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    6. Vlad Ivanenko & Dmitry Mikheyev, 2002. "The Role of Non-monetary Trade in Russian Transition," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 405-419.
    7. Ewa Baranowska-Prokop & Jacek Prokop, 2007. "Dyskryminacja cenowa a transakcje wiązane," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 67-84.
    8. Yangyang Huang & Zhenyang Pi & Weiguo Fang, 2021. "Trade Credit with Barter in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(20), pages 1-15, October.
    9. Agapov Stanislav & Boyarchenko Svetlana & Levendorsky Sergey, 2003. "A Three-Sector Model of the Russian Virtual Economy," EERC Working Paper Series 02-06e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    10. Hua, Guowei & Zhang, Yi & Cheng, T.C.E. & Wang, Shouyang & Zhang, Juliang, 2020. "The newsvendor problem with barter exchange," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    11. Sergei Guriev & Dmitry Kvassov, 2000. "Barter for price discrimination? A theory and evidence from Russia," Working Papers w0007, New Economic School (NES).
    12. Kim, Byung-Yeon & Pirttila, Jukka, 2004. "Money, barter, and inflation in Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 297-314, June.
    13. Vlad Ivanenko, 2004. "Access to liquidity and non-monetary trade in Russia," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 21-38.
    14. Milena Bieniek, 2021. "Bartering: Price-Setting Newsvendor Problem with Barter Exchange," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-22, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • P42 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Productive Enterprises; Factor and Product Markets; Prices

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