A model of long-term contracts
Long-term contracts are explained as equilibrium strategies of supergames. In the specific coherent general equilibrium model provided, limited mobility of labor, in the form of a fixed cost of moving, generates long-term contracts.
|Date of creation:||1980|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
- Bryant, John, 1978. "An Annotation of "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria."," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(6), pages 1159-60, December.
- Carlton, Dennis W, 1978.
"Market Behavior with Demand Uncertainty and Price Inflexibility,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 571-87, September.
- D. W. Carlton, 1976. "Market Behavior With Demand Uncertainty and Price Inflexibility," Working papers 179, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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