Macroeconomic implications of competitive college admissions
We present a public higher education model in which there exist indivisibilities in educational investment. Consequently, when demand for educational services exceed supply, a screening mechanism, which may potentially be imperfect, is required to choose the student body. We demonstrate how distortions or biases in screening--caused by parental factors--interact with the distribution of income to help explain the considerable differences across countries in the share of resources devoted to public higher education. Moderate degrees of admission bias lower the share of resources devoted to public education whereas higher levels of bias may have positive effects on public education supply. Thus, while lower screening biases lead to a better allocation of a given amount of spending on education, they do not necessarily lead to more political support for public education, and thereby to higher aggregate human capital and output. When wage rates are endogenous, the effects of screening biases on public higher education supply can be positive even for smaller biases. Moreover, higher inequality will lead to a lower share of resources devoted to public higher education when biases are relatively moderate.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/order.htm|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Perotti, Roberto, 1994. "Income distribution and investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 827-835, April.
- Bénabou, Roland, 1996.
CEPR Discussion Papers
1419, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1973. "The Effect of Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: The Case of Higher Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(1), pages 1-27, Jan.-Feb..
- Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, 2013.
"Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,"
2013-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, 1991.
"Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,"
NBER Working Papers
3668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Rogerson, Richard, 1995.
"On the Political Economy of Education Subsidies,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 249-62, April.
- Stiglitz, J. E., 1974. "The demand for education in public and private school systems," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 349-385, November.
- Raquel Fernandez, 1998.
"Education and Borrowing Constraints: Tests vs. Prices,"
NBER Working Papers
6588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fernandez, R., 1998. "Education and Borrowing Constraints: Tests vs Prices," Working Papers 98-17, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Fernández, Raquel, 1998. "Education and Borrowing Constraints: Tests Vs. Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 1913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mark Gradstein & Moshe Justman, .
"Democratic Choice of an Education System: Implications for Growth and Income Distribution,"
CARESS Working Papres
97-05, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Gradstein, Mark & Justman, Moshe, 1997. " Democratic Choice of an Education System: Implications for Growth and Income Distribution," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 169-83, July.
- Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B, 1992. "Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 818-34, August.
- Radner, Roy & Miller, L S, 1970. "Demand and Supply in U. S. Higher Education: A Progress Report," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(2), pages 326-34, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:613. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kris Vajs)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.