Acquisition targets and motives in the banking industry
This paper uses a large sample of individual banking organizations, observed from 1996 to 2003, to investigate the characteristics that made them more likely to be acquired. We use a definition of acquisition that we consider preferable to that used in much of the previous literature, and we employ a competing-risk hazard model that reveals important differences that depend on the type of acquirer. Since interstate acquisitions became more numerous during this period, we also investigate differences in the determinants of acquisition between in-state and out-of-state acquirers. The hypothesis that acquisitions serve to transfer resources from less efficient to more efficient uses receives substantial support from our results, as do a number of other relevant hypotheses.
|Date of creation:||2006|
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1995-013, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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- Aigbe Akhigbe & Jeff Madura & Ann Whyte, 2004. "Partial Anticipation and the Gains to Bank Merger Targets," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 55-71, August.
- Kwangwoo Park & George Pennacchi, 2007.
"Harming depositors and helping borrowers: the disparate impact of bank consolidation,"
0704, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Kwangwoo Park & George Pennacchi, 2009. "Harming Depositors and Helping Borrowers: The Disparate Impact of Bank Consolidation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 1-40, January.
- Dean F. Amel & Stephen A. Rhoades, 1989. "Empirical Evidence on the Motives for Bank Mergers," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 17-27, Jan-Mar.
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