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Optimal Contracts, Aggregate Risk, and the Financial Accelerator

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This paper derives the optimal lending contract in the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), hereafter BGG. The optimal contract includes indexation to the aggregate return on capital, household consumption, and the return to internal funds. This triple indexation results in a dampening of fluctuations in leverage and the risk premium. Hence, compared with the contract originally imposed by BGG, the privately optimal contract implies essentially no financial accelerator.

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  • Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst & Matthias Paustian, 2014. "Optimal Contracts, Aggregate Risk, and the Financial Accelerator," Working Papers (Old Series) 1420, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1420
    DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-201420
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    Cited by:

    1. Yi Wen & Xiaochuan Xing & Patrick Pintus, 2016. "Interest Rate Dynamics, Variable-Rate Loans, and the Business Cycle," 2016 Meeting Papers 293, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Pintus, Patrick A. & Wen, Yi & Xing, Xiaochuan, 2022. "The inverted leading indicator property and redistribution effect of the interest rate," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    3. Pierluigi Balduzzi & Emanuele Brancati & Marco Brianti & Fabio Schiantarelli, 2020. "Credit Constraints anf Firms' Decisions: Evidence from the COVID-19 Outbreak Italian Firms’ Expectations and Plans," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1013, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 07 Oct 2022.
    4. Stephane Verani, 2018. "Aggregate Consequences of Dynamic Credit Relationships," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 29, pages 44-67, July.
    5. Raouf Boucekkine & Giorgio Fabbri & Patrick A. Pintus, 2018. "Short-run pain, long-run gain: the conditional welfare gains from international financial integration," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 329-360, March.
    6. Adrien Auclert, 2019. "Monetary Policy and the Redistribution Channel," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(6), pages 2333-2367, June.
    7. Raouf Boucekkine & Giorgio Fabbri & Patrick A. Pintus, 2018. "Short-run pain, long-run gain: the conditional welfare gains from international financial integration," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 329-360, March.
    8. Balduzzi, Pierluigi & Brancati, Emanuele & Brianti, Marco & Schiantarelli, Fabio, 2020. "The Economic Effects of COVID-19 and Credit Constraints: Evidence from Italian Firms' Expectations and Plans," IZA Discussion Papers 13629, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Barbara Annicchiarico & Marco Carli & Francesca Diluiso, 2022. "Climate Policies, Macroprudential Regulation, and the Welfare Cost of Business Cycles," CEIS Research Paper 543, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 31 Oct 2022.
    10. Gete, Pedro & Melkadze, Givi, 2018. "Aggregate volatility and international dynamics. The role of credit supply," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 143-158.
    11. Giacomo Candian & Mikhail Dmitriev, 2020. "Risk Aversion, Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Risk, and the Financial Accelerator," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 37, pages 299-322, July.
    12. Lewis, Vivien & Roth, Markus, 2018. "Interest rate rules under financial dominance," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 70-88.
    13. Dr. Gregor Bäurle & Sarah M. Lein & Elizabeth Steiner, 2022. "Firm net worth, external finance premia and monitoring cost - estimates based on firm-level data," Working Papers 2022-07, Swiss National Bank.
    14. Candian, Giacomo & Dmitriev, Mikhail, 2020. "Optimal contracts and supply-driven recessions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    15. Josef Schosser & Jochen Wilhelm, 2018. "Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 129-139, October.
    16. Pancrazi, Roberto & Seoane, Hernán D. & Vukotic, Marija, 2016. "The price of capital and the financial accelerator," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 86-89.
    17. Wang, Chenxi, 2022. "Firm asset structure and risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    18. Strobel, Johannes & Lee, Gabriel & Dorofeenko, Victor & Salyer, Kevin, 2019. "Time-Varying Risk Shocks and the Zero Lower Bound," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203491, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Alfred Duncan & Charles Nolan, 2015. "Objectives and Challenges of Macroprudential Policy," Working Papers 2015_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    20. Alfred Duncan, 2016. "Private information and business cycle risk sharing," Working Papers 2016_02, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    21. Wong, Chin-Yoong & Eng, Yoke-Kee, 2018. "Is optimal Islamic financial contract stabilizing? The perspective of a New Keynesian model with the financial accelerator," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 121-133.
    22. Rivero-Leiva, David, 2022. "A note on the costly state verification problem with information gathering," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agency costs; CGE models; optimal contracting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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