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La paradoja de la protección contractual: Proteger al débil de hoy excluye al débil de mañana

Author

Listed:
  • Benito Arruñada

Abstract

Muchas políticas no fracasan por mala intención ni por torpeza técnica, sino porque responden a una demanda política miope. Este artículo examina una sola paradoja: proteger a la parte débil en los contratos en vigor suele perjudicar a quienes, con esa misma fragilidad, intentarán contratar después. El alquiler residencial en España lo ilustra bien. El conflicto central no enfrenta tanto a propietarios e inquilinos como a inquilinos actuales y futuros. Cuando el legislador o el juez reescriben contratos vigentes o debilitan su cumplimiento, conceden un alivio visible hoy, pero elevan el riesgo, reducen la oferta y endurecen mañana el acceso al mercado. La salida no pasa por más tutela retroactiva, sino por ayudas de emergencia financiadas con presupuesto, reglas generales y prospectivas para la contratación, ejecución rápida y reformas que amplíen la oferta.

Suggested Citation

  • Benito Arruñada, 2026. "La paradoja de la protección contractual: Proteger al débil de hoy excluye al débil de mañana," Fedea Economy Notes 2026-11, FEDEA.
    • Handle: RePEc:fda:fdafen:2026-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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