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Survival of Political Leadership

Listed author(s):
  • Nurmikko, Sanna

We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off opposition and increase his chances of re-election. In a collusive equilibrium, the leader allocates a bribe to the army, and the latter responds by producing political violence. Such an equilibrium is more likely, the larger are the public resources available to the leader; the lower is army’s potential punishment and salary offered by the opposition regime; the more severe is the incumbent’s potential punishment; and when the political leader is sufficiently patient, but the army is short-sighted enough.

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Paper provided by University of Essex, Department of Economics in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 8925.

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Date of creation: 2008
Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:8925
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  1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
  2. Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Warner, Andrew M., 1999. "The big push, natural resource booms and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 43-76, June.
  3. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, March.
  4. Eliana Laferrara & Robert H. Bates, 2001. "Political Competition in Weak States," CID Working Papers 68A, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
  5. William Easterly & Ross Levine & David Roodman, 2003. "New Data, New Doubts: Revisiting "Aid, Policies, and Growth"," Working Papers 26, Center for Global Development.
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