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On the Relevance of the Median Voter to Resource Allocation amongst Jurisdictions

  • Santhanu Gupta
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    Allocation of local public good over three jurisdictions with individuals with heterogeneous tastes, in a model with democratic institutions and majority rule. The nature of electoral uncertainty, the expectations of individuals from government captured by their reservation utilities, and heterogeneity in tastes within a jurisdiction are observed to affect resource allocation [GIPE WP No.3].

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    File URL: http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownload.aspx?fname=Document11682007530.2385065.pdf&fcategory=Articles&AId=1145&fref=repec
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    Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:1145.

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    Date of creation: Aug 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1145
    Note: Institutional Papers
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    1. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August.
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2108, The World Bank.
    3. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
    4. Seabright, Paul, 1994. "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 889, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Santanu Gupta, 2001. "Political Accountability and Fiscal Federalism," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 263-280, May.
    6. George Warskett & Stanley Winer & Walter Hettich, 1998. "The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 123-151, May.
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