Long-term vs Short-term Contracts: A European Perspective on Natural Gas
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- Neuhoff, K. & von Hirschhausen, C., 2005. "Long-term vs. Short-term Contracts; A European perspective on natural gas," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0539, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
References listed on IDEAS
- Mohammed A. Al-Sahlawi, 1989. "The Demand for Natural Gas: A Survey of Price and Income Elasticities," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 77-90.
- Javier Estrada & Ole Fugleberg, 1989. "Price Elasticities of Natural Gas Demand in France and West Germany," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 77-90.
- Masten, Scott E, 1988. "Minimum Bill Contracts: Theory and Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 85-97, September.
- Masten, Scott E & Crocker, Keith J, 1985. "Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1083-1093, December.
- Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, 1988. "Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 327-343, Autumn.
- Mulherin, J Harold, 1986. "Complexity in Long-term Contracts: An Analysis of Natural Gas Contractual Provisions," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 105-117, Spring.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
- Parsons, John E, 1989. " Estimating the Strategic Value of Long-term Forward Purchase Contracts Using Auction Models," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(4), pages 981-1010, September.
- Ken Costello & Hillard G. Huntington & James F. Wilson, 2005. "After the Natural Gas Bubble: An Economic Evaluation of the Recent U.S. National Petroleum Council Study," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 89-110.
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- Han, Lei, 2009. "Market acceptance of cloud computing: An analysis of market structure, price models and service requirements," Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management 42, University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management.
- Newell, Richard G. & Pizer, William A., 2008. "Indexed regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 221-233, November.
- Anne Neumann & Sophia Rüster & Christian von Hirschhausen, 2015. "Long-Term Contracts in the Natural Gas Industry: Literature Survey and Data on 426 Contracts (1965-2014)," Data Documentation 77, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Roques, Fabien A., 2008.
"Technology choices for new entrants in liberalized markets: The value of operating flexibility and contractual arrangements,"
Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 245-253, December.
- Roques, F.A., 2007. "Technology Choices for New Entrants in Liberalised Markets: The Value of Operating Flexibility and Contractual Arrangements," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0759, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- repec:taf:ceasxx:v:61:y:2009:i:5:p:833-856 is not listed on IDEAS
- Catherine Locatelli, 2007. "Les stratégies d'internationalisation de Gazprom, enjeu de la constitution d'une grande compagnie d'Etat russe," Post-Print halshs-00115377, HAL.
- Michèle Breton & Mohammed Kharbach, 2009. "Who benefits from price indexation?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 2732-2737.
More about this item
Keywordscontracts; gas; market power; demand elasticity; liberalisation; Europe;
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
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