IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Note on Bargaining over Complementary Pieces of Information in Networks

  • Kaniska Dam

    ()

    (Division of Economics, CIDE)

  • Antonio Jiménez-Martínez

    ()

    (Division of Economics, CIDE)

We consider two specific network structures, the star and the line, and study the set of bilateral alternating-offers bargaining procedures for the pairs of connected agents. Agents have complementary information and bargain over the relative price of their pieces of information. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for each of these network structures.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://cide.edu/repec/economia/pdf/DTE504.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by CIDE, División de Economía in its series Working papers with number DTE 504.

as
in new window

Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:emc:wpaper:dte504
Contact details of provider: Postal: Carretera México Toluca 3655 Lomas Sta. Fe, México D.F.
Phone: 01 800 021 2433
Web page: http://www.cide.edu/divisiones-academicas/economia/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Polanski, Arnold, 2007. "A decentralized model of information pricing in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 497-512, September.
  2. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  3. Abreu, Dilip & Manea, Mihai, 2012. "Bargaining and efficiency in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 43-70.
  4. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2009. "Strategic Communication Networks," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00367692, HAL.
  5. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2004. "Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-77, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:emc:wpaper:dte504. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Daniel Ventosa-Santaulària)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.