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A note on bargaining over complementary pieces of information in networks

Author

Listed:
  • Kaniska Dam

    () (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas)

  • Antonio Jimenez-Martinez

    () (Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas)

Abstract

We consider two specific network structures, the star and the line, and study the set of bilateral alternating-offers bargaining processes for the pairs of linked agents. Agents have complementary information, bargain simultaneously over the price of their pieces of information, and benefit from their exchanges only after they finish all their negotiation processes. We propose meaningful distributions of the initial bargaining power of the agents according to the restrictions to negotiation imposed by the network, and study the resulting equilibrium prices and payoffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Kaniska Dam & Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, 2012. "A note on bargaining over complementary pieces of information in networks," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3098-3110.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00875
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
    3. Abreu, Dilip & Manea, Mihai, 2012. "Bargaining and efficiency in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 43-70.
    4. Polanski, Arnold, 2007. "A decentralized model of information pricing in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 497-512, September.
    5. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2004. "Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-77, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bilateral bargaining; information exchange; first-mover advantage; networks;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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