Voting Leaders and Voting Participation
We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner take all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campain spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. In the unique Nash equilibrium larger elections are characterized by a higher participation rate. Moreover, no matter what the voters' preferences are, parties spend exactly the same amounts for their campain in equilibrium. Platforms converge to the center (median voter) and spending increases as the uncertainty over voters' preferences decreases.
|Date of creation:||11 Aug 2004|
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- John Ledyard, 1983.
"The Pure Theory of Large Two Candidate Elections,"
569, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1983. "A strategic calculus of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 7-53, January.
- Barry Nalebuff & Roni Shachar, 1997.
"Follow The Leader: Theory And Evidence On Political Participation,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm57, Yale School of Management.
- Barry Nalebuff & Ron Shachar, 1999. "Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 525-547, June.
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