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Institutional Logics as Strategic Resources

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  • Durand , Rodolphe

    ()

  • Szostak , Bérangère

    ()

  • Jourdan , Julien

    ()

  • Thornton , Patricia

    ()

Abstract

We propose that institutional logics are resources organizations use to leverage their strategic choices. We argue that firms with an awareness of multiple available logics, expressed by a larger stock of competences and a broader industrial scope are more likely to add an institutional logic to their repertoire and to become purist in this new logic. We also hypothesize that a favorable opportunity set as expressed by status leads high and low status firms to add a logic but not to focus exclusively on this new logic. We examine our hypotheses in the French industrial design industry from 1989 to 2003 in which a managerialist logic emerged and prevailed along with the pre-existing institutional logics of modernism and formalism. Our findings contribute to theory on the relationship between organizations’ strategy and institutional change and partially address the paradox of why high-status actors play a key role in triggering institutional change when such change is likely to undermine the very basis of their social position and advantage

Suggested Citation

  • Durand , Rodolphe & Szostak , Bérangère & Jourdan , Julien & Thornton , Patricia, 2013. "Institutional Logics as Strategic Resources," Les Cahiers de Recherche 1004, HEC Paris.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:1004
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    Keywords

    Institutional logics; strategic resources; institutional plurality; strategic choice; logic addition; logic focus;

    JEL classification:

    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General

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