Random walks and voting theory
Voters' preferences depend on the available information. Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random walks.
|Date of creation:||01 May 2002|
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- VIEILLE, Nicolas & GILBOA, Itzhak, 2002.
"Majority vote following a debate,"
Les Cahiers de Recherche
761, HEC Paris.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1992.
"Case-Based Decision Theory,"
994, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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