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Experimental Economic Approaches on Trade Negotiations

Author

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  • Hankyoung Sung

    (Korean Institute for International Economic Policy)

Abstract

This paper experimentally examines the multilateral bargaining games to derive some policy implications for real trade negotiations. It shows the following findings : there are significant delays in games including veto players in some circumstances, but no delays in games including multiple-vote players. In addition, non-veto players as weak players, which are disadvantaged in taking share, make collusive attempts against veto players, but not effectively. As policy implications, this paper suggests enforceable deadlines or threats toward low-quality agreements to reduce the delay problems. Furthermore, as another remedy for the delays, it suggests an effort to group countries like multiple-vote players in unequal-weight games.

Suggested Citation

  • Hankyoung Sung, 2007. "Experimental Economic Approaches on Trade Negotiations," Trade Working Papers 22001, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:eab:tradew:22001
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    File URL: http://www.eaber.org/node/22001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:04:p:813-823_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Fr Chette, Guillaume R. & Kagel, John H. & Lehrer, Steven F., 2003. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(02), pages 221-232, May.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:04:p:809-820_21 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Veto; Trade Negotiations; Delay;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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