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Top Trading Cycles vs. the Crawler: The Role of Obvious Strategy-Proofness

Author

Listed:
  • Aleksei Chernulich
  • Nobuyuki Hanaki
  • Yuki Tamura

Abstract

Obvious strategy-proofness makes truth-telling, in theory, an obvious choice. We experimentally study its role in the object-reallocation problem with single-peaked preferences. We compare two efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms, Top Trading Cycles and the Crawler, under static and gradual implementations. In our experiment, all four mechanisms generate the same outcome under truth-telling, but only the Gradual Crawler is obviously strategy-proof. The Gradual Crawler achieves significantly higher empirical efficiency than the other mechanisms. By contrast, the Gradual TTC does not outperform the Static TTC, suggesting that gradual implementation alone is not sufficient and that the Gradual Crawler benefits from its stop-or-continue procedure.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleksei Chernulich & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Yuki Tamura, 2026. "Top Trading Cycles vs. the Crawler: The Role of Obvious Strategy-Proofness," ISER Discussion Paper 1318, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1318
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2020. "On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    2. Bade, Sophie, 2019. "Matching with single-peaked preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 81-99.
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