Voluntary Participation in the Design of Non-excludable Public Goods Provision Mechanisms
Groves-Ledyard (1977) constructed a mechanism attaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of public goods. After this path-breaking paper, many mechanisms have been proposed to attain desirable allocations with public goods. Thus, economists have thought that the free-rider problem is solved, in theory. Our view to this problem is not so optimistic. Rather, we propose fundamental impossibility theorems with public goods. In the previous mechanism design, it was implicitly assumed that every agent must participate in the mechanism that the designer provides. This approach neglects one of the basic features of public goods: non-excludability. We explicitly incorporate non-excludability and then show that it is impossible to construct a mechanism in which every agent has an incentive to participate.
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- Cason, T.N. & Saijo, T. & Yamato, T., 2000.
"Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: an International Comparison,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0491, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Timothy Cason & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehiko Yamato, 2002. "Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: An International Comparison," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 133-153, October.
- Cason, T.N. & Saijo, T. & Yamato, T., 1998. "Voluntary Participation and Spite in Public Good Provision Experiments: an International Comparison," Papers 98-002, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
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