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Enracinement des dirigeants et richesse des actionnaires

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  • Benoît Pigé

    (Université de Franche-Comté)

Abstract

Le Pdg, en tant qu'agent, est incité à accroître son enracinement pour réduire son risque de révocation. Le modèle d'enracinement proposé intègre l'appartenance à des réseaux relationnels ainsi que le niveau des efforts fournis tel qu'il transparaît dans la performance antérieure de l'entre-prise. À partir d'un échantillon de 1 747 observations annuelles concernant 258 Pdg d'entreprises cotées au cours de la période 1966-1990, nous avons évalué l'importance des réseaux relationnels internes et de la performance antérieure en établissant une mesure de l'enracinement du dirigeant. Il semble qu'il existe un optimum d'enracinement.

Suggested Citation

  • Benoît Pigé, 1998. "Enracinement des dirigeants et richesse des actionnaires," Working Papers CREGO 0980903, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:0980903
    Note: article publié dans Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol.1, n°3, septembre 1998, p.131-158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Mohamed Sadok GASSOUMA, 2019. "Abnormal accounting accruals Management by market disciplinary approach: Evidence in Tunisian banks before and after the Arab Revolution," Journal of Finance and Investment Analysis, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 8(2), pages 1-2.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    enracinement; dirigeants; performance; gouvernement d'entreprise;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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