A Note on Enough Money in a Strategic Market Game with Complete or Fewer Markets
This paper discusses the notion of "enough money" in strategic market games. In an economy with one money, m-1 markets and no credit, in order to be able to achieve efficient trade there must be "enough money" held by all traders. In essence "enough money" means that the noncooperative equilibrium solutions to a strategic market game is interior, in other words it is not considered by lack of liquidity. For simplicity two specific market mechanisms are described to illustrate the relationship between market structure and liquidity.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1984|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics Letters (1985), 19: 231-235|
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-68, October.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April.
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