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A note on enough money in a strategic market game with complete or fewer markets

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  • Shubik, Martin

Abstract

This paper discusses the notion of "enough money" in strategic market games. In an economy with one money, m-1 markets and no credit, in order to be able to achieve efficient trade there must be "enough money" held by all traders. In essence "enough money" means that the noncooperative equilibrium solutions to a strategic market game is interior, in other words it is not considered by lack of liquidity. For simplicity two specific market mechanisms are described to illustrate the relationship between market structure and liquidity.
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  • Shubik, Martin, 1985. "A note on enough money in a strategic market game with complete or fewer markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 231-235.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:19:y:1985:i:3:p:231-235
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Shubik & D.P. Tsomocos, 1990. "A Strategic Market Game with a Mutual Bank with Fractional Reserves and Redemption in Gold (A Continuum of Traders)," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 964, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Dmitry Levando, 2020. "The two demands: Why a demand for non-consumable money is different from a demand for consumable goods," Working Papers 2020:05, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    3. Dmitry Levando, 2012. "A Survey Of Strategic Market Games," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 57(194), pages 63-106, July - Se.

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