Asset Markets and Investment Decisions
In an incomplete asset market, firms assign values to investment plans by projecting their payoffs on the span of the payoffs of marketed assets; equivalently, firms employ the Capital Asset Pricing Model. This is a criterion that does not require firms to possess information, such as the marginal valuation of revenue across date -- events by shareholders, which is not observable; rather, it is based on information revealed by the prices and payoffs of marketed assets. Under standard assumptions, competitive equilibria exist. But, competitive equilibrium allocations need not satisfy a condition of constrained Pareto optimality that recognizes the incompleteness of the asset market; and, even in the absence of nominal assets, competitive equilibrium allocations are generically indeterminate -- they are determinate if firm consider the commodity payoffs of shares.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1997|
|Publication status:||Published in International Economic Review (2002), 43: 857-873|
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- Debreu, Gerard, 1970.
"Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria,"
Econometric Society, vol. 38(3), pages 387-392, May.
- DEBREU, Gérard, "undated". "Economies with a finite set of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP 67, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Peter M. DeMarzo, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 713-734. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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