IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Site collectif polluant et monopole : localisation et tarification

  • Denis LESCOP

    (CRESE, Université de Besançon)

Registered author(s):

    Un groupe d'agents décide de mettre à sa disposition un site collectif polluant. Pour ce faire, ils font appel à une entreprise chargée de la localisation et de la construction de l'installation. Celle-ci leur propose une procédure de localisation/tarification soumise à l'approbation de tous les agents. Dans un tel contexte, l'entreprise est forcée à internaliser les dommages subis par les agents dans sa fonction de coût : ce phénomène rappelle l'achat de droit à polluer. En information incomplète, les mécanismes incitatifs optimaux indiquent l'existence d'inefficacités dues à l'attribution d'une rente informationnelle à chaque agent : la localisation échoue alors qu'elle aurait profité à tout le monde. Dans deux applications (externalités diffuses et externalités locales) du modèle général, l'enchère optimale est complètement caractérisée.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2004014.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2004014.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 30
    Date of creation: 01 Mar 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2004014
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
    Fax: +32 10473945
    Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April.
    2. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul & Knez, Peter J. & Yaksick, Rudy, 1987. "A compensation mechanism for siting noxious facilities: Theory and experimental design," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 371-383, December.
    3. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
    4. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 194-218, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2004014. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sebastien SCHILLINGS)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.