Games with Complementarities
We introduce a class of games with complementarities that has the quasisupermodular games, hence the supermodular games, as a special case. Our games retain the main property of quasisupermodular games : the Nash set is a nonemply complete lattice. We use monotonicity properties on the best reply that are weaker than those in the literature, as well as pretty simple and linked with an intuitive idea of complementarity. The sufficient conditions on the payoffs are weaker than those in quasisupermodular games. We also separate the conditions implying existence of a greatest and a least Nash equilibrium from those, stronger, implying that the Nash set is a complete lattice
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 2007|
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- Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994.
"Monotone Comparative Statics,"
Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January.
- Zhou Lin, 1994. "The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 295-300, September.
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- Vives, Xavier, 1990.
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- Samuelson, Paul A, 1974. "Complementarity-An Essay on the 40th Anniversary of the Hicks-Allen Revolution in Demand Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1255-89, December.
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