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Games with complementarities

Author

Listed:
  • CALCIANO, Filippo L.

    (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

Abstract

We introduce a class of games with complementarities that has the quasisupermodular games, hence the supermodular games, as a special case. Our games retain the main property of quasisupermodular games: the Nash set is a nonempty complete lattice. We use monotonicity properties on the best reply that are weaker than those in the literature, as well as pretty simple and linked with an intuitive idea of complementarity. The sufficient conditions on the payoffs are weaker than those in quasisupermodular games. We also separate the conditions implying existence of a greatest and a least Nash equilibrium from those, stronger, implying that the Nash set is a complete lattice.

Suggested Citation

  • CALCIANO, Filippo L., 2007. "Games with complementarities," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2007016, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2007016
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    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2007.html
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    Cited by:

    1. Filippo L. Calciano, 2009. "Nash equilibria of games with monotonic best replies," Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' 0108, Department of Economics - University Roma Tre.
    2. Takashi Kamihigashi & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2021. "Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 289-312, October.
    3. CALCIANO, Filippo L., 2011. "Oligopolistic competition with general complementarities," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2011054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Lu Yu, 2024. "Nash equilibria of quasisupermodular games," Papers 2406.13783, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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