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Audit contracts and reputation

Author

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  • Portilla, Yolanda

Abstract

This paper characterizes the contractual relationship between an external auditor and a manager of a client firm when the incentives for both agents are implicit as in the career concerns framework. The main result is that the earning management and the audit effort are decreasing over time because the incentives to build a reputation also decline for both agents in spite of a managers first mover advantage. This suggests that the audit effort should be higher when the auditor is an emerging firm and the future employment opportunities for the client firm?s manager are larger.

Suggested Citation

  • Portilla, Yolanda, 2009. "Audit contracts and reputation," UC3M Working papers. Economics we091308, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we091308
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Meyer, Margaret A & Vickers, John, 1997. "Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 547-581, June.
    2. Emiliano Ruiz Barbadillo & Nieves Gómez Aguilar & Nieves Carrera Pena, 2006. "Evidencia empírica sobre el efecto de la duración del contrato en la calidad de la auditoría: análisis de las medidas de retención y rotación obligatoria de auditores," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 30(2), pages 283-316, May.
    3. Michael Firth, 1997. "The Provision of Non-audit Services and the Pricing of Audit Fees," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 511-525.
    4. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
    5. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    6. Mathias Dewatripont & Ian Jewitt & Jean Tirole, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 199-217.
    7. repec:bla:joares:v:22:y:1984:i:2:p:679-702 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contract theory;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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