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General equilibrium, welfare and policy when firms have market power

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  • Moreno, Diego
  • Petrakis, Emmanuel

Abstract

We consider a market economy in which consumption goods are produced using high- and low-skilled labor. When rms have market power, the economy's surplus, aggregate income, employment, wages, and labor share are smaller than those under perfect competition. A low binding minimum wage alleviates the ineficiency and distributional bias caused by market power, without creating unemployment. Revenues from non-distortionary corporate taxes may be used to fund distributional policies (e.g., unemployment subsidies) and/or public spending enhancing production possibilities (e.g., education/innovation programs).Free entry leads to eficient entry under perfect competition but may lead to either excessive or insuficient entry when rms have market power.

Suggested Citation

  • Moreno, Diego & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2024. "General equilibrium, welfare and policy when firms have market power," UC3M Working papers. Economics 45283, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:45283
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean & Vial, Jean-Philippe, 1972. "Oligopoly "A la cournot" in a general equilibrium analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 381-400, June.
    2. Shapiro, Carl, 2018. "Antitrust in a time of populism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 714-748.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    General Equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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