Cournot competition among multiproduct firms:specialization through licensing
In a duopoly where each firm produces substitute goods, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2006|
|Publication status:||Published in International Journal of Business and Economics, 5(3), 2006, pp. 201-210.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/TeoriaEconomica|
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