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Cournot competition among multiproduct firms:specialization through licensing

Author

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  • Luigi Filippini

    (DISCE, Università Cattolica)

Abstract

In a duopoly where each firm produces substitute goods, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage. Patent pool extension confirms the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Filippini, 2006. "Cournot competition among multiproduct firms:specialization through licensing," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0542, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctc:serie6:itemq0542
    as

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    File URL: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/TeoriaEconomica/Quaderni/Quaderno_42.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 1986. "Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 471-491.
    2. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Cross licensing of complementary technologies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 329-348, September.
    4. Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Patent Licensing and R&D Rivalry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 25-30, May.
    5. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
    6. Lin, Ping, 1996. "Fixed-Fee Licensing of Innovations and Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 443-449, December.
    7. Mukesh Eswaran, 1994. "Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating Device," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 689-708, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cross-licensing; patent pool; specialization; process innovation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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