Job search theory and the slippery slope framework: an attempt to integration
Recently, attempts have been made to formalize the assumptions of the ‘slippery slope’ framework about the effects of trust (in) and power (of) tax authorities on tax compliance. In this sense, the proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the ‘slippery slope’ framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market with tax evasion. The key result of this integration is the following: with the right mix of policy tools of deterrence and trust in tax authorities, a reduction in tax evasion may increase labour market tightness and decrease unemployment.
|Date of creation:||06 Feb 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche Via S. Angelo Loc. Folcara 03043 Cassino (FR) - Italy|
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- Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Nielsen, Søren Bo, 2007.
"Under-reporting of income and Labour Market Performance,"
10-2007, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Ann-Sofie Kolm & Søren Bo Nielsen, 2008. "Under-reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 195-217, 04.
- Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Nielsen, Søren Bo, 2005. "Under-reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance," Research Papers in Economics 2005:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
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