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International Asset Allocation with Time-Varying Investment Opportunities

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  • Blake, David
  • Timmermann, Allan G

Abstract

This paper analyses the international equity holdings of a large panel of UK pension funds. We find considerable evidence of market timing activity, as illustrated by the funds' decision to scale back their investments in the US stock market during the 1990s. To explain this we model portfolio weight dynamics as a function of time-varying conditional moments. We find that a substantial part of the evolution in portfolio weights is explained by time-varying conditional expected returns, volatilities and covariances with domestic equity returns. Consequently, controlling for the effect of state variables that track time-variations in investment opportunities significantly affects estimates of returns from international market timing. Our estimates suggest that the portfolio movements that were orthogonal to such state variables accounted for a net loss of 0.2 per cent per annum for the average fund.

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  • Blake, David & Timmermann, Allan G, 2002. "International Asset Allocation with Time-Varying Investment Opportunities," CEPR Discussion Papers 3464, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3464
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    Cited by:

    1. Rui Albuquerque & Gregory Bauer & Martin Schneider, 2004. "Characterizing Asymmetric Information in International Equity Markets," International Finance 0405005, EconWPA.
    2. Albuquerque, Rui & H. Bauer, Gregory & Schneider, Martin, 2009. "Global private information in international equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 18-46, October.
    3. Blake, David & Cairns, Andrew & Dowd, Kevin, 2008. "Turning pension plans into pension planes: What investment strategy designers of defined contribution pension plans can learn from commercial aircraft designers," MPRA Paper 33749, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Nadima El-Hassan & Paul Kofman, 2003. "Tracking Error and Active Portfolio Management," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 28(2), pages 183-207, September.
    5. Rossi, Alberto G. & Blake, David & Timmermann, Allan & Tonks, Ian & Wermers, Russ, 2015. "Network centrality and pension fund performance," CFR Working Papers 15-16, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    6. David Blake & Alberto G. Rossi & Allan Timmermann & Ian Tonks & Russ Wermers, 2013. "Decentralized Investment Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 1133-1178, June.
    7. repec:eee:jfinec:v:124:y:2017:i:3:p:535-562 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:eee:finmar:v:36:y:2017:i:c:p:17-39 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Fernandez, Pablo & Aguirreamalloa, Javier & Corres, Luis, 2012. "Rentabilidad de los Fondos de Pensiones en España. 2001-2011," IESE Research Papers D/947, IESE Business School.
    10. Kamel Laaradh, 2007. "« Investir Sur Le Marche Inernational Des Actions A-T-Il Plus D'Effet Sur La Persistance De La Performance Des Fonds ? Illustration Britannique »," Post-Print halshs-00544930, HAL.
    11. Moosa, Imad A. & Al-Deehani, Talla M., 2009. "The Myth of International Diversification," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 62(3), pages 383-406.
    12. repec:eee:glofin:v:34:y:2017:i:c:p:43-53 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Gabriele Zinna, 2014. "Price pressures in the UK index-linked market: an empirical investigation," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 968, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    14. Manuel Ammann & Andreas Zingg, 2008. "Investment Performance of Swiss Pension Funds and Investment Foundations," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 144(II), pages 153-195, June.

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    Keywords

    international asset allocation; investment performance; market timing; UK pension funds;

    JEL classification:

    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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