How do European Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Behave?
The objective of this study is to investigate the behaviour of monetary and fiscal authorities in the Euro area. Our main contribution is joint modeling of behaviour of the two authorities. Our investigation highlights a number of facts. The systematic monetary policies adopted by the non-German authorities in the seventies were not capable of stabilizing inflation. Such results have been achieved in the eighties and the nineties by anchoring more tightly domestic monetary policy to German monetary policy. All the main episodes of expansionary fiscal policy which have occurred in the course of the eighties and the nineties in Europe cannot be explained by the systematic behaviour of fiscal authorities. Stabilization of inflation has been achieved independently from the lack of fiscal discipline. There are important interactions between the two authorities but they depend exclusively on the responses of governments expenditures and receipts to interest rate payments on the public debt.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
- Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall.
- Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1997.
"Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence,"
NBER Working Papers
6254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1998. "Monetary policy rules in practice Some international evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 1033-1067, June.
- Clarida, Richard & Galí, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1750, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Clarida, Richard & Gali, Jordi & Gertler, Mark, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," Working Papers 97-32, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Clarida, R. & Gertler, M., 1996.
"How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy,"
96-14, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Ben S. Bernanke & Ilian Mihov, 1995.
"Measuring Monetary Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
5145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernanke, Ben S. & Mihov, Ilian, 1997.
"What does the Bundesbank target?,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1025-1053, June.
- William Poole, 1999.
"Monetary policy rules?,"
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 3-12.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3426. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.