A new formulation of the European day-ahead electricity market problem and its algorithmic consequences
A new formulation of the optimization problem implementing European market rules for non- convex day-ahead electricity markets is presented, that avoids the use of complementarity constraints to express market equilibrium conditions, and also avoids the introduction of auxiliary binary variables to linearise these constraints. Instead, we rely on strong duality theory for linear or convex quadratic optimization problems to recover equilibrium constraints imposed by most of European power exchanges facing indivisible orders. When only so-called stepwise preference curves are considered to describe continuous bids, the new formulation allows to take full advantage of state-of-the-art solvers, and in most cases, an optimal solution together with market clearing prices can be computed for large-scale instances without any further algorithmic work. The new formulation also suggests a very competitive Benders-like decomposition procedure, which helps to handle the case of interpolated preference curves that yield quadratic primal and dual objective functions, and consequently a dense quadratic constraint. This procedure essentially consists in strengthening classical Benders cuts locally. Computational experiments on real data kindly provided by main European power exchanges (Apx-Endex, Belpex and Epex spot) show that in the linear case, both approaches are very efficient, while for quadratic instances, only the decomposition procedure is tractable and shows very good results. Finally, when most orders are block orders, and instances are combinatorially very hard, the new MILP approach is substantially more efficient.
|Date of creation:||31 Dec 2013|
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