Mechanism design for multiple item procurement using a distributed ellipsoid algorithm
We study a problem in a procurement setting in which an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) wants to procure a set of items from a set of suppliers. Each supplier incurs a cost for supplying any subset/bundle of items, and each supplier's cost information is known only to him. The goal is to determine (i) an efficient allocation of suppliers to items and (ii) appropriate payments for suppliers. We formulate the problem of determining which supplier should supply what items as an integer program. We develop a method, which is based on the ellipsoid method, that solves the dual of the linear relaxation of the problem in polynomial time. We also show that the linear relaxation has an integral optimal solution.
|Date of creation:||00 Dec 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sven de Vries & James Schummer, 2005.
"On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects,"
2005 Meeting Papers
389, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- de Vries, Sven & Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2007. "On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 95-118, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2005087. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.