Political institutions and policy outcomes in Colombia: the effects of the 1991 Constitution
Abstract: The 1991 Colombian constitution strengthened the checks and balances of the political system by enhancing the role of Congress and the Constitutional Court, while somewhat limiting the powers of the president (who nonetheless remains extremely powerful even for Latin American standards). As a consequence of the larger number of relevant players, and the removal of barriers that restricted political participation, the political system gained in terms of representation. However, political transaction costs increased, making cooperation harder to achieve. We show that this has been typically the case of fiscal policy, where the use of rigid rules, the constitutionalization of some policies, and reduction in legislative success rates -due to the presence of a more divided and fragmented congress- have limited the adaptability and flexibility of policies. In contrast, in other areas of policy -such as monetary policy and regulation of public utilities- that were formally delegated to the technocracy, policies have been more adaptable to economic shocks, delivering better outcomes.
|Date of creation:||30 Jan 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mauricio Cárdenas & Zeinab Partow, 1998. "Oil, coffee and the dynamic commons problems in Colombia," WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 009206, FEDESARROLLO.
- Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2002.
"Endogenous Political Institutions,"
NBER Working Papers
9006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aghion, Philippe & Alesina, Alberto & Trebbi, Francesco, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," Scholarly Articles 4481498, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Albero Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2002. "Endogenous Political Institutions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1957, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Aghion, Philippe & Alesina, Alberto F & Trebbi, Francesco, 2002. "Endogenous Political Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3473, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hernán Rincón & Jenny Berthel & Miguel Gómez, 2003.
"Balance fiscal estructural y cíclico del gobierno nacional central de Colombia, 1980-200,"
Ensayos sobre Política Económica,
Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 0(44), pages 12-62, Diciembre.
- Hernan Rincon Castro & Jennyberthel & Miguelgomez, 2004. "Balance Fiscalestructural Y Cíclico Del Gobierno Nacional Central De Colombia,1980-2002," ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ESPE.
- Hernán Rincón & Jenny Berthel & Miguel Gómez, 2003. "Balance fiscal estructural y cíclico del gobierno nacional central de Colombia, 1980-200," ENSAYOS SOBRE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA - ESPE.
- Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2000.
"The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina,"
29, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2000.
- Pablo T. Spiller, 2003. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 281-306, October.
- Juan Carlos Echeverry & Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin, 2004. "La Batalla Política Por El Presupuesto De La Nación: Inflexibilidades O Supervivencia Fiscal," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 002944, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- Mauricio Cardenas & Zeinab Partow, 1998. "Oil, Coffee and the Dynamic Commons Problems in Colombia," Research Department Publications 3033, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Kugler, Maurice & Rosenthal, Howard, 2000.
"Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separation of political powers in Colombia,"
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
0018, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Maurice Kugler & Howard Rosental, 2000. "Checks and balances: an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia," WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 002117, FEDESARROLLO.
- Alicia Adsera & Carles Boix & Mark Payne, 2000.
"Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government,"
Research Department Publications
4241, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- AlÌcia Adserý, 2003. "Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 445-490, October.
- J. Mark Payne & Carles Boix & Alícia Adserà, 2000. "Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6478, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Robert H. Bates, 1998. "Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 6067.
- Cardenas, Mauricio & Barrera, Felipe, 1997. "On the effectiveness of capital controls: The experience of Colombia during the 1990s," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 27-57, October.
- Levitt Steven & Mauricio Rubio, 2000. "Understanding crime in Colombia and what can be done about It," WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 003735, FEDESARROLLO.
- Carlos Esteban Posada & Carlos Caballero Argáez, 2003. "Una Nota Sobre Los Elementos Coyunturales Y Estructurales Del Deficit Fiscal En El Caso Colombiano Reciente," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 003718, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
- Sebastián Edwards & Roberto Steiner, 2000. "On The Crisis Hypothesis of Economic Reform: Colombia 1989-91," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 37(112), pages 445-493.
- Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller & Ernesto Stein, 2003. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes. An Intertemporal Transactions Framework," Working Papers 59, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2003.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000123:003344. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucía Fenney Pérez)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.