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My bibliography Save this paperFurther Remarks on Adverse Selection and Statistical Discrimination
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"Informational Equilibrium,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
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- Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
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