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Further Remarks on Adverse Selection and Statistical Discrimination

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  • John G. Riley

    (UCLA)

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  • John G. Riley, 1982. "Further Remarks on Adverse Selection and Statistical Discrimination," UCLA Economics Working Papers 255, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:255
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp255.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    2. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
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