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The Economics of Buying Probabilities: Parallel and Intensive Research

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  • Ben T. Yu

    (UCLA)

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  • Ben T. Yu, 1981. "The Economics of Buying Probabilities: Parallel and Intensive Research," UCLA Economics Working Papers 208A, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:208a
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp208A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yu, Ben T, 1981. "Potential Competition and Contracting in Innovation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 215-238, October.
    2. Cheung, Steven N S, 1970. "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 49-70, April.
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