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Monotone Implementation

  • Levent Ulku


    (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM))

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    We study a class of direct revelation mechanisms which implement outcome functions satisfying a monotonicity condition. Monotone implementation is in dominant strategy equilibrium when values are private and in ex post Nash equilibrium when values are interdependent. The original Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not a monotone implementation mechanism although its many extensions to interdependent value models are. The extraction mechanisms of Cremer and McLean (1985) are a special form of monotone implementation mechanisms for finite type spaces.

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    Paper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number 1004.

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    Length: 32 pages
    Date of creation: 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cie:wpaper:1004
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    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000001000, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
    3. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2005. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," NBER Working Papers 11765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William B. Zame, 2006. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," Post-Print halshs-00754157, HAL.
    5. Levin, Jonathan, 1997. "An Optimal Auction for Complements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 176-192, February.
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