High Stakes Behavior with Low Payoffs: Inducing Preferences with Holt-Laury Gambles
A continuing goal of experiments is to understand risky decisions when the decisions are important. Often a decision’s importance is related to the magnitude of the associated monetary stake. Khaneman and Tversky (1979) argue that risky decisions in high stakes environments can be informed using questionnaires with hypothetical choices (since subjects have no incentive to answer questions falsely.) However, results reported by Holt and Laury (2002, henceforth HL), as well as replications by Harrison (2005) suggest that decisions in “high” monetary payoff environments are not well-predicted by questionnaire responses. Thus, a potential implication of the HL results is that studying decisions in high stakes environments requires using high stakes. Here we describe and implement a procedure for studying high-stakes behavior in a low-stakes environment. We use the binary-lottery reward technique (introduced by Berg, et al (1986)) to induce preferences in a way that is consistent with the decisions reported by HL under a variety of stake sizes. The resulting decisions, all of which were made in a low-stakes environment, reflect surprisingly well the noisy choice behavior reported by HL’s subjects even in their highstakes environment. This finding is important because inducing preferences evidently requires substantially less cost than paying people to participate in extremely high-stakes games.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (714) 628-2830
Fax: (714) 628-2881
Web page: http://www.chapman.edu/esi/Email:
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daniel Houser & Stefan Vetter & Joachim Winter, 2011.
"Fairness and Cheating,"
1019, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Houser, Daniel & Vetter, Stefan & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Fairness and cheating," Munich Reprints in Economics 19375, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Houser, Daniel & Vetter, Stefan & Winter, Joachim, 2010. "Fairness and Cheating," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 335, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Berg, Joyce E, et al, 1986. "Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 281-306, May.
- Camerer, Colin F. & Hogarth, Robin M., 1999.
"The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework,"
1059, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
- Helga Fehr-Duda & Adrian Bruhin & Thomas Epper & Renate Schubert, 2010.
"Rationality on the rise: Why relative risk aversion increases with stake size,"
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 147-180, April.
- Helga Fehr-Duda & Adrian Bruhin & Thomas Epper & Renate Schubert, 2007. "Rationality on the Rise: Why Relative Risk Aversion Increases with Stake Size," SOI - Working Papers 0708, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Feb 2008.
- Glenn W. Harrison & Eric Johnson & Melayne M. McInnes & E. Elisabet Rutstr�m, 2005. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 897-901, June.
- Harrison, Glenn W, 1994. "Expected Utility Theory and the Experimentalists," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 223-53.
- Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
- Berg, Joyce E & Dickhaut, John W & Rietz, Thomas A, 2003. " Preference Reversals and Induced Risk Preferences: Evidence for Noisy Maximization," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 139-70, October.
- Selten, Reinhard & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Klaus Abbink, 1995.
"Money does Not Induce Risk Neutral Behavior, but Binary Lotteries Do even Worse,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
343, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Reinhard Selten & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Klaus Abbink, 1999. "Money Does Not Induce Risk Neutral Behavior, but Binary Lotteries Do even Worse," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 213-252, June.
- Rapoport, Amnon & Stein, William E. & Parco, James E. & Nicholas, Thomas E., 2003. "Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 239-265, May.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1976. "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 274-79, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:08-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Megan Luetje)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.