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Why Don’t All Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust Preferred Securities

Author

Listed:
  • Nicole M. Boyson

    (Northeastern University - D’Amore-McKim School of Business)

  • Rüdiger Fahlenbrach

    (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute)

  • René M. Stulz

    (Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI))

Abstract

We investigate why only some banks use regulatory arbitrage. We predict that banks wanting to be riskier than allowed by capital regulations (constrained banks) use regulatory arbitrage while others do not. We find support for this hypothesis using trust preferred securities (TPS) issuance, a form of regulatory arbitrage available to almost all U.S. banks from 1996 to Dodd-Frank. We also find support for predictions that constrained banks are riskier, perform worse during the crisis, and use multiple forms of regulatory arbitrage. We show that neither too-big-to-fail incentives nor misaligned managerial incentives are first-order determinants of this type of regulatory arbitrage.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicole M. Boyson & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, 2014. "Why Don’t All Banks Practice Regulatory Arbitrage? Evidence from Usage of Trust Preferred Securities," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 14-21, Swiss Finance Institute, revised Dec 2015.
    • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1421
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    Cited by:

    1. Conlon, Thomas & Cotter, John & Molyneux, Philip, 2020. "Beyond common equity: The influence of secondary capital on bank insolvency risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    2. Hugonnier, Julien & Morellec, Erwan, 2017. "Bank capital, liquid reserves, and insolvency risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 266-285.
    3. van Wijnbergen, Sweder & Fatouh, Mahmoud & Neamtu, Ioana, 2020. "Risk-Taking, Competition and Uncertainty: Do CoCo Bonds Increase the Risk Appetite of Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 14530, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Gropp, Reint & Mosk, Thomas & Ongena, Steven & Simac, Ines & Wix, Carlo, 2020. "Supranational rules, national discretion: Increasing versus inflating regulatory bank capital?," SAFE Working Paper Series 296, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    5. Pennacchi, George G. & Santos, João A.C., 2021. "Why do banks target ROE?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    6. Dong Beom Choi & Michael R. Holcomb & Donald P. Morgan, 2020. "Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: Old Question‐New Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(S1), pages 241-266, October.
    7. Fatouh, Mahmoud & Neamțu, Ioana & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 2021. "Risk-taking and uncertainty: do contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds increase the risk appetite of banks?," Bank of England working papers 938, Bank of England.
    8. Fulvia Fringuellotti & João A. C. Santos, 2021. "Insurance Companies and the Growth of Corporate Loan Securitization," Liberty Street Economics 20211013, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    9. Jiang, Hai & Yuan, Chao, 2022. "Monetary policy, capital regulation and bank risk-taking：Evidence from China," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    10. Efing, Matthias, 2015. "Arbitraging the Basel securitization framework: Evidence from German ABS investment," Discussion Papers 40/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    11. Chen, Jiakai, 2022. "Market discipline and regulatory arbitrage: Evidence from ABCP liquidity guarantors," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    12. Abbassi, Puriya & Schmidt, Michael, 2018. "A comprehensive view on risk reporting: Evidence from supervisory data," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 74-85.
    13. Puriya Abbassi & Rajkamal Iyer & José-Luis Peydró & Paul E. Soto, 2020. "Stressed banks? Evidence from the largest-ever supervisory review," Economics Working Papers 1721, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    14. Yann Braouezec & Keyvan Kiani, 2021. "Target capital ratio and optimal channel(s) of adjustment: A simple model with empirical applications to European banks," Post-Print halshs-03341768, HAL.
    15. Dal Borgo, Mariela, 2022. "Internal models for deposits: Effects on banks' capital and interest rate risk of assets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    16. Ongena, Steven & Conlon, Thomas & Huan, Xing, 2020. "Operational Risk Capital," CEPR Discussion Papers 15096, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. van Wijnbergen, Sweder & Neamtu, Ioana & Fatou, Mahmoud, 2022. "Risk-Taking, Competition and Uncertainty: Do Contingent Convertible (CoCo) Bonds Increase the Risk Appetite of Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 17062, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Gabriel A. Ogunmola & Fengsheng Chien & Ka Yin Chau & Li Li, 2022. "The Influence of Capital Requirement of Basel III Adoption on Banks’ Operating Efficiency: Evidence from U.S. Banks," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 11(2), pages 5-26.
    19. Philippe Oster, 2020. "Contingent Convertible bond literature review: making everything and nothing possible?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 343-381, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulatory arbitrage; bank capital requirements; quality of bank capital;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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